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Abstract
We provide the impact on asset prices of search-and-bargaining
frictions in over-the-counter markets. Under natural conditions, prices
are lower and illiquidity discounts higher when counterparties are
harder to find, when sellers have less bargaining power, when the frac-
tion of qualified owners is smaller, or when risk aversion, volatility, or
hedging demand are larger. If agents face risk limits, then higher
volatility leads to greater difficulty locating unconstrained buyers, re-
sulting in lower prices. Information can fail to be revealed through
trading when search is difficult. We discuss a variety of financial ap-
plications and testable implications.
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Many assets, such as mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds, emerging-
market debt, bank loans, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, private equity,
and real estate, are traded in OTC markets. Traders in OTC markets must
search for counterparties, incurring opportunity or other costs. When two
counterparties meet, their bilateral relationship is strategic; prices are set
through a bargaining process that reflects each investor’s alternatives to im-
mediate trade.
We provide a theory and applications of dynamic asset pricing in OTC
markets, one that explicitly treats search and bargaining. We show how the
explicitly calculated equilibrium allocations and prices depend on investors’
search abilities, bargaining powers, risk limits, and risk aversion, and discuss
a variety of financial applications and testable implications.
Under natural conditions, illiquidity discounts are lower, and prices are
higher, if investors can find each other more easily, if sellers have more bar-
gaining power, if the fraction of qualified owners is greater, if volatility is
lower, or if risk aversion is lower. If agents face risk limits, then higher
volatility leads to greater difficulty locating unconstrained buyers, resulting
in higher illiquidity discounts and lower prices. Finally, information can fail
to be revealed through trade when search is difficult.
We first model the pricing of a consol bond traded by risk-neutral agents, a
special case of the model by Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2003). Investors
contact one another randomly at some mean rate λ, a parameter reflecting
search ability. When two agents meet, they bargain over the terms of trade
based on endogenously determined outside options. Gains from trade arise
from heterogeneous costs or benefits of holding assets.
We then extend this model to OTC markets with risky securities. This
allows us to incorporate the effects of risk aversion, risk limits, and private
information.
In our OTC market model, a risk-averse asset owner searches for a po-
tential buyer when the asset ceases to be a relatively good hedge of his
endowment. We show how asset prices are affected by search frictions and
demonstrate how they could magnify the effective risk premium due to in-
complete risk sharing, beyond that of a liquid but incomplete-markets setting
such as Constantinides and Duffie (1996).
Our result complements the literature that studies the price effect of ex-
ogenously specified trading cost (Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Constan-
tinides (1986), Vayanos (1998), and Huang (2003)) by endogenizing the trad-
ing cost in the context of OTC markets. Krainer and LeRoy (2002) study
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housing prices in a different search framework.
With the imposition of risk limits, we show how search-based liquidity
frictions become endogenously dependent on volatility, in that higher volatil-
ity leads to smaller equilibrium holdings, resulting in more sellers and fewer
available buyers. For sellers, this leads to longer search times and a relatively
unfavorable bargaining position, which in turn implies higher illiquidity price
discounts.
Introducing asymmetric information, we provide an example in which
investors are sufficiently anxious about the threat of search delays that they
offer “pooling prices,” revealing no information. Hence, search frictions may
not only slow the dissemination of information, but prevent it altogether.1
The endogenous impact of asymmetric information on trading costs and asset
prices has been addressed by Kyle (1985), Wang (1993), and Gaˆrleanu and
Pedersen (2000), among others.
Weill (2002) and Vayanos and Wang (2002) have extended our model in
order to treat multiple assets in the same economy, obtaining cross-sectional
restrictions on asset returns. In Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2003), which
focuses on the role of marketmakers, we show that search frictions have dif-
ferent implications for bid-ask spreads than do information frictions. Miao
(2004) provides a variant of this model. Weill (2003) studies the implications
of search frictions in an extension of our model in which marketmakers’ in-
ventories “lean against” the outside order flow. Newman and Rierson (2003)
present a model in which supply shocks temporarily depress prices across
correlated assets, as providers of liquidity search for long-term investors,
supported by empirical evidence of issuance impacts across the European
telecommunications bond market. In Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2002),
we use the modeling framework introduced here to characterize the impact
on asset prices and securities lending fees of the common institution by which
would-be shortsellers must locate lenders of securities before being able to
sell short. Difficulties in locating lenders of shares can allow for dramatic
price imperfections, as, for example, in the case of the spinoff of Palm, Incor-
porated, documented by Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2002) and Lamont
and Thaler (2003). Further discussion of implications for over-the-counter
asset pricing provided in Section 6.
1Wolinsky (1990) constructs a steady-state partially-revealing equilibrium in a search
model with asymmetric information, while rational-expectations equilibria in frictionless
markets are studied by Grossman (1981), Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), and others. See
also Serrano and Yosha (1993) and Serrano and Yosha (1996).
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Search models have been studied extensively in the context of labor eco-
nomics, starting with the “coconuts” model of Diamond (1982), and in the
context of monetary economics. Our search-and-bargaining structure, in par-
ticular is similar to that of the monetary model of Trejos and Wright (1995),
but our objectives and results are different.
Section 1 lays out the basic model and results, using risk-neutral agents.
Section 2 treats hedging motives for trade under risk aversion, and Section 3
provides a numerical example. Section 4 characterizes the implications of risk
limits on prices and trades. Section 5 provides an illustration of how search
frictions impede the dissemination of information through trade or prices.
Further implications and financial applications are discussed in Section 6.
Proofs and supplementary results are relegated to appendices.
1 Basic Search Model of Asset Prices
This section introduces an over-the-counter market, that is, a setting in which
agents can trade only when they meet each other, and in which transaction
prices are bargained.2
Agents are risk-neutral and infinitely lived, with a constant time-preference
rate β > 0 for consumption of a single non-storable numeraire good.3
An agent can invest in a bank account — which can also be interpreted as
a “liquid” security — with a risk-free interest rate of r. The liquid wealth Wt
must be bounded below, and r = β in the context of this section, since agents
are risk neutral. Further, agents may trade a long-lived asset in an over-the-
counter market. The asset can be traded only bilaterally, when in contact
with a counterparty. We begin for simplicity by taking the illiquid asset to
be a consol, which pays one unit of consumption per unit of time. Later,
when introducing the effects of risk limits, or risk aversion, or asymmetric
information regarding dividends, we generalize to random dividend processes.
An agent is characterized by an intrinsic preference for asset ownership
that is “high” or “low.” A low-type agent, when owning the asset, has a
2The model of this section is a special case of the one introduced by Duffie, Gaˆrleanu,
and Pedersen (2003), as are the solution technique and results until, but not including,
Propostion 1.
3Specifically, an agent’s preferences among adpated finite-variation cumulative con-
sumption processes are represented by the utility E
(∫∞
0
e−βt dCt
)
for a cumulative con-
sumption process C, whenever the integral is well defined.
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holding cost of δ per time unit. A high-type agent has no such holding cost.
We could imagine this holding cost to be a shadow price for ownership by
low-type agents, due, for example, to (i) low personal liquidity, that is, a need
for cash, (ii) high financing costs, (iii) adverse correlation of asset returns
with endowments (formalized in Section 2), (iv) a relative tax disadvantage,
as studied by Dai and Rydqvist (2003) in an empirical analysis of search-
and-bargaining effects in the context of tax trading,4 or (v) a relatively low
personal use for the asset, as may happen, for example, for certain durable
consumption goods such as homes. The agent’s intrinsic type is a Markov
chain, switching from low to high with intensity λu, and back with intensity
λd. The intrinsic-type processes of any two agents are independent.
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A fraction s of agents are initially endowed with one unit of the asset.
Investors can hold at most one unit of the asset and cannot shortsell. Because
agents have linear utility, it is without much loss of generality that we restrict
attention to equilibria in which, at any given time and state of the world,
an agent holds either 0 or 1 unit of the asset. Hence, the full set of agent
types is T = {ho, hn, lo, ln}, with the letters “h” and “l” designating the
agent’s current intrinsic liquidity state as high or low, respectively, and with
“o” or “n” indicating whether the agent currently owns the asset or not,
respectively.
We suppose that there is a “continuum” (a non-atomic finite measure
space) of agents, and let µσ(t) denote the fraction at time t of agents of type
σ ∈ T . Normalizing the total number of agents to 1 implies that
1 = µho(t) + µhn(t) + µlo(t) + µln(t). (1)
Equating the supply s with the total number of owners gives
s = µho(t) + µlo(t). (2)
An agent finds a counterparty with an intensity λ, where λ reflects the
efficiency of the search technology. We assume randomly matched counter-
parties, so the probability that the counterparty is, say, an lo investor is µlo.
4Dai and Rydqvist (2003) study tax trading between a small group of foreign investors
and a larger group of domestic investors. They find that investors from the “long side
of the market” get part of the gains from trade, under certain conditions, which they
interpret as evidence of a search-and-bargaining equilibrium.
5All random variables are defined on a probability space (Ω,F , P r) with corresponding
filtration {Ft : t ≥ 0} of sub-σ-algebras of F satisfying the usual conditions, as defined by
Protter (1990). The filtration represents the resolution over time of information commonly
available to investors. Asymmetric information is considered in Section 5.
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Thus, the intensity of finding an lo investor is λµlo. Hence, assuming the law
of large numbers applies,6 hn investors contact lo investors at a total (almost
sure) rate of λµloµhn and, since lo investors contact hn investors at the same
total rate, the total rate of such counterparty matchings is 2λµloµhn.
To solve the model, we proceed in two steps. First, we use the insight that
the only form of encounter that provides gains from trade is one in which low-
type owners sell to high-type non-owners. From bargaining theory, we know
(see Appendix A) that at these encounters, trade occurs immediately. We
can therefore determine the steady-state asset allocations without reference
to prices. Given the steady-state masses µ, we consider investors lifetime
utility depending on their type, the bargaining problem, and the resulting
price.
In equilibrium, the rates of change of the fractions of the respective in-
vestor types are
µ˙lo(t) = −2λµhn(t)µlo(t)− λuµlo(t) + λdµho(t)
µ˙hn(t) = −2λµhn(t)µlo(t)− λdµhn(t) + λuµln(t)
µ˙ho(t) = 2λµhn(t)µlo(t)− λdµho(t) + λuµlo(t) (3)
µ˙ln(t) = 2λµhn(t)µlo(t)− λuµln(t) + λdµhn(t).
The intuition for, say, the first equation in (3) is straightforward: Whenever
an lo agent meets an hn investor, he sells his asset and is no longer an lo
agent. This (together with the law of large numbers) explains the first term
on the right hand side of (3). The second term is due to type changes in
which lo investors become ho investors, and the last term is due to type
changes from ho to lo investors.
Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2003) show that there is a unique stable
steady-state solution, that is, a constant solution with µ˙(t) = 0. The steady
state is computed by using (1)–(2) and the fact that µlo +µln = λd/(λu +λd)
to write the first equation in (3) as a quadratic equation in µlo, given as
Appendix equation (C.1).
Having determined the steady-state fractions of investor types, we com-
pute the investors’ equilibrium intensities of finding counterparties of each
type and, hence, their utilities for remaining lifetime consumption, as well as
the bargained price P . For a particular agent, his utility depends on his cur-
rent type, σ(t) ∈ T , and the wealth W (t) in his bank account. Specifically,
6Duffie and Sun (2004) provide a measure-theoretic framework in which the law of large
numbers indeed applies with search and random matching.
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lifetime utility is W (t) + Vσ(t), where, for each investor type σ in T , Vσ is a
constant to be determined.
In steady state, the expected growth of any agent’s utility must be the
discount rate r, which yields the steady-state equations
0 = rVlo − λu(Vho − Vlo)− 2λµhn(P − Vlo + Vln)− (1− δ)
0 = rVln − λu(Vhn − Vln)
0 = rVho + λd(Vho − Vlo)− 1 (4)
0 = rVhn + λd(Vhn − Vln)− 2λµlo(Vho − Vhn − P ).
The price is determined through bilateral bargaining. A high-type non-
owner will pay at most his reservation value ∆Vh = Vho−Vhn, while a low-type
owner requires a price of at least ∆Vl = Vlo − Vln. Nash bargaining, or the
Rubinstein-type game considered in Appendix A, implies that the bargaining
process results in the price
P = ∆Vl(1− q) + ∆Vh q , (5)
where q ∈ [0, 1] is the bargaining power of the seller. The linear system of
Equations (4)-(5) has a unique solution, with
P =
1
r
−
δ
r
r(1− q) + λd + 2λµlo(1− q)
r + λd + 2λµlo(1− q) + λu + 2λµhnq
. (6)
This price (6) is the present value, 1/r, of dividends, reduced by an illiq-
uidity discount. The price is lower and the discount is larger, ceteris paribus,
if the distressed owner has less hope of switching type (lower λu), if it is more
difficult for the owner to find other buyers (lower µhn), if the buyer may more
suddenly need liquidity himself (higher λd), if it is easier for the buyer to find
other sellers (higher µlo), or if the seller has less bargaining power (lower q).
These intuitive results are based on partial derivatives of the right-hand
side of (6) — in other words, they hold when a parameter changes without
influencing any of the others. We note, however, that the steady-state type
fractions µ themselves depend on λd, λu, and λ. The following proposition
offers a characterization of the equilibrium steady-state effect of changing
each parameter.
Proposition 1 The steady-state equilibrium price P is decreasing in δ, s,
and λd, and is increasing in λu and q. Further, if s < λu/(λu + λd), then
P → 1/r as λ → ∞, and P is increasing in λ for all λ ≥ λ¯, for a constant
λ¯ depending on the other parameters of the model.
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The condition that s < λu/(λu + λd) means that, in steady state, there is
less than one unit of asset per agent of high intrinsic type.
It can be checked that the above results extend to risky dividends, for
instance in the following ways: (i) If the cumulative dividend is risky with
constant drift ν, then the equilibrium is that for a consol bond with dividend
rate of ν; (ii) if the dividend rate and illiquidity cost are proportional to
a process X with EtX(t + u) = X(t)e
νu, for some constant growth rate ν,
then the price and value functions are also proportional to X, with factors of
proportionality given as above, with r replaced by r−ν; (iii) if the dividend-
rate process X satisfies EtX(t + u) = X(t)+mu for a constant drift m (and
if illiquidity costs are constant), then the continuation values are of the form
X(t)/r + vσ for owners and vσ for non-owners, where the constants vσ are
computed in a similar manner.
Next, we model risky dividends using cases (i) and (iii) above, in the
context of risk aversion and risk limits.
2 Risk-Aversion
This section provides a version of the asset-pricing model with risk aversion,
in which the motive for trade between two agents is the different extent to
which they derive hedging benefits from owning the asset. We provide a sense
in which this economy can be interpreted in terms of the basic economy of
Section 1.
Agents have constant-absolute-risk-averse (CARA) additive utility, with
a coefficient γ of absolute risk aversion and with time preference at rate β.
An asset has a cumulative dividend process D satisfying
dD(t) = mD dt + σD dB(t), (7)
where mD and σD are constants, and B is a standard Brownian motion with
respect to the given probability space and filtration (Ft). Agent i has a
cumulative endowment process ηi, with
dηi(t) = mη dt + ση dB
i(t), (8)
where the standard Brownian motion Bi is defined by
dBi(t) = ρi(t) dB(t) +
√
1− ρi(t)2 dZ i(t), (9)
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for a standard Brownian motion Z i independent of B, and where ρi(t) is the
“instantaneous correlation” between the asset dividend and the endowment
of agent i. We model ρi as a two-state Markov chain with states ρh and
ρl > ρh. The intrinsic type of an agent is identified with this correlation
parameter. An agent i whose intrinsic type is currently high (that is, with
ρi(t) = ρh) values the asset more highly than does a low-intrinsic-type agent,
because the increments of the high-type endowment have lower conditional
correlation with the asset’s dividends. As in the basic model of Section 1,
agents’ intrinsic types are pairwise-independent Markov chains, switching
from l to h with intensity λu, and from h to l with intensity λd. An agent
owns either θn or θo units of the asset, where θn < θo. For simplicity, no
other positions are permitted, which entails a loss in generality. Agents can
trade the OTC security only when they meet, as previously. The agent type
space is T = {lo, ln, ho, hn}. In this case, the symbols ‘o’ and ‘n’ indicate
large and small owners, respectively. Given a total supply Θ of shares per
investor, market clearing requires that
(µlo + µho)θo + (µln + µhn)θn = Θ, (10)
which, using (1), implies that the fraction of large owners is
µlo + µho = s ≡
Θ− θn
θo − θn
. (11)
We consider a particular agent whose type process is σ, and let θ denote
the associated asset-position process (that is, θ(t) = θo whenever σ(t) ∈
{ho, lo} and otherwise θ(t) = θn). We suppose that there is a perfectly liquid
“money-market” asset with constant risk-free rate of return r, which, for
simplicity, is assumed to be determined outside of the model (as is typical
in the literature treating asset-pricing models based on CARA utility). The
agent’s money-market wealth process W satisfies
dW (t) = (rW (t)− c(t)) dt + θ(t) dD(t) + dη(t)− P dθ(t),
where c is the agent’s consumption process, η is the agent’s cumulative en-
dowment process, P is the asset price per share (which is constant in the
equilibria that we examine). The last term thus captures payments in con-
nection with trade. The consumption process is required to satisfy measur-
ability, integrability, and transversality conditions stated in Appendix C.
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We consider a steady-state equilibrium, and let J(w, σ) denote the in-
direct utility of an agent of type σ ∈ {lo, ln, ho, hn} with current wealth
w. Assuming sufficient differentiability, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation for an agent of current type lo is
0 = sup
c∈R
{− e−γc + Jw(w, lo)(rw − c + θomD + mη)
+
1
2
Jww(w, lo)(θ
2
oσ
2
D + σ
2
η + 2ρlθoσDση)− βJ(w, lo)
+ λu[J(w, ho)− J(w, lo)] + 2λµhn[J(w + Pθ, ln)− J(w, lo)]},
where θ = θo − θn. The HJB equations for the other agent types are similar.
Under technical regularity conditions found in Appendix C, we verify that
J(w, σ) = −e−rγ(w+aσ+a¯), (12)
where
a¯ =
1
r
(
log r
γ
+ mη −
1
2
rγσ2η −
r − β
rγ
)
, (13)
and where, for each σ, the constant aσ is determined as follows. The first-
order conditions of the HJB equation of an agent of type σ imply an optimal
consumption rate of
c = −
log(r)
γ
+ r(w + aσ + a¯). (14)
Inserting this solution for c into the respective HJB equations yields a system
characterizing the coefficients aσ.
The price P is determined using Nash bargaining with seller bargaining
power q, similar in spirit to the basic model of Section 1. Given the reser-
vation values of buyer and seller implied by J(w, σ), the bargaining price
satisfies alo − aln ≤ Pθ ≤ aho − ahn. The following result obtains.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, an agent’s consumption is given by (14), the
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value function is given by (12), and (alo, aln, aho, ahn, P ) ∈ R
5 solve
0 = ralo + λu
e−rγ(aho−alo) − 1
rγ
+ 2λµhn
e−rγ(Pθ+aln−alo) − 1
rγ
− (κ(θo)− θoδ¯)
0 = raln + λu
e−rγ(ahn−aln) − 1
rγ
− (κ(θn)− θnδ¯) (15)
0 = raho + λd
e−rγ(alo−aho) − 1
rγ
− κ(θo)
0 = rahn + λd
e−rγ(aln−ahn) − 1
rγ
+ 2λµlo
e−rγ(−Pθ+aho−ahn) − 1
rγ
− κ(θn),
with
κ(θ) = θmD −
1
2
rγ
(
θ2σ2D + 2ρhθσDση
)
(16)
δ¯ = rγ(ρl − ρh)σDση > 0, (17)
as well as the Nash bargaining equation,
q
(
1− erγ(Pθ−(alo−aln))
)
= (1− q)
(
1− erγ(−Pθ+aho−ahn)
)
. (18)
A natural benchmark is the price with vanishing search frictions:
Proposition 3 If s < µhn + µho, then, as λ →∞,
P →
κ(θo)− κ(θn)
rθ
. (19)
In order to compare the equilibrium for this model to that of the basic
model, we use the linearization ez − 1 ≈ z, which leads to
0 ≈ ralo − λu(aho − alo)− 2λµhn(Pθ − alo + aln)− (κ(θo)− θoδ¯)
0 ≈ raln − λu(ahn − aln)− (κ(θn)− θnδ¯)
0 ≈ raho − λd(alo − aho)− κ(θo)
0 ≈ rahn − λd(aln − ahn)− 2λµlo(aho − ahn − Pθ)− κ(θn)
Pθ ≈ (1− q)(alo − aln) + q(aho − ahn).
These equations are of the same form as those in Section 1 for the indirect
utilities and asset price in an economy with risk-neutral agents, with divi-
dends at rate κ(θo) for large owners and dividends at rate κ(θn) for small
10
λ λu λd s r β q δ
60 1.0 0.1 0.80 0.05 0.05 0.5 0.875
Table 1: Base-case parameters for basic model.
owners, and with illiquidity costs given by δ¯. In this sense, we can view the
basic model as a risk-neutral approximation of the effect of search illiquidity
in a model with risk aversion. The approximation error goes to zero for small
risk aversion γ or small agent heterogeneity (that is, small ρl − ρh). Solving
specifically for the price P in the associated linear model, we have
P =
κ(θo)− κ(θn)
rθ
−
δ¯
r
r(1− q) + λd + 2λµlo(1− q)
r + λd + 2λµlo(1− q) + λu + 2λµhnq
. (20)
We see that the price is the perfect-market price from Proposition 3, less an
illiquidity discount. The expression (17) for δ¯ shows that the illiquidity cost
in the basic model can be interpreted as a hedging-based incentive to trade.
This incentive is increasing in the risk aversion γ, the endowment-correlation
difference ρl − ρh, and the volatilities of dividends and endowments.
3 Illustrative Example
We consider an example that serves to illustrate both the basic model and
the model with risk aversion, and how the latter can be well approximated
by the former.
Table 1 contains the exogenous parameters for the base-case risk-neutral
model. With the tabulated switching intensities for intrinsic types, agents
are in a high intrinsic state for an average of 10 years out of every 11, that is,
λu/(λu+λd). The search and switching intensities shown imply the stationary
fractions of each type that are listed in Table 2. We see that only a small
fraction of the asset, 0.0054/0.8 or about 0.67% of the total supply, is mis-
allocated through search frictions to low intrinsic types. The equilibrium
asset price, 19.05, however, is substantially below the perfect market price
of r−1 = 20, reflecting a significant impact of illiquidity on the price, despite
the relatively small impact on the asset allocation.
Our base-case version of the risk-aversion model is specified by the basic-
model parameters of Table 1 as well as the parameters of Table 3. The
11
µho µhn µlo µln P
0.7946 0.1145 0.0054 0.0855 19.05
Table 2: Steady-state masses and asset price, basic model.
γ ρh ρl µη ση µD σD Θ θo θn
0.0035 −0.5 0.5 10000 10000 1 0.5 16000 20000 0
Table 3: Additional base-case parameters with risk-aversion.
parameters of these tables are consistent in the following sense. First, the
“illiquidity cost” δ = δ = 0.875 of low-intrinsic-type is that implied by (17)
from the hedging costs of the risk-aversion model. Second, the total amount
Θ of shares and the investor positions, θo and θn, imply the same fraction
s = 0.8 of the population holding large positions, using (11). The investor
positions that we adopt for this illustrative example are realistic in light
of the positions adopted by high and low type investors in the associated
Walrasian (perfect) market with unconstrained trade sizes, which, as shown
in Appendix B, has an equilibrium large-owner position size of 17,818 shares
and a small-owner position size of −2, 182 shares. Third, the certainty-
equivalent dividend-rate per share, (κ(θo)−κ(θn))/(θo− θn) = 1, is the same
as that of the base-case model.
Figure 1 shows how prices are reduced by illiquidity to a degree that
depends on the search intensity λ. (Note that λ does not affect δ or κ( · ), so
the risk-neutral model is the same for all values of λ.) The figure reflects the
fact that as the search intensity λ becomes large, the allocation and price
become equal to the perfect-market ones (Propositions 1 and 3).
Figures 2 and 3 show how prices are discounted for illquidity, relative
to the perfect-markets price, by an amount that depends on risk aversion
and volatility. As we vary the parameters in these figures, we compute both
the equilibrium solution of the risk-aversion model and the solution of the
associated basic risk-neutral model that is obtained by the linearization (20),
taking δ from (17) case by case.
We see that the illiquidity discount increases with risk aversion and
volatility and that both effects are large for our benchmark parameters. The
illiquidity discount ranges between 1% and 16% depending on the risk and
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Figure 1: Price response to search intensity.
risk aversion.
Also, these figures show that the equilibrium price of the OTC market
model with risk aversion is generally well approximated by our closed-form
expression (20).
4 Risk Limits and Endogenous Position Size
In this section, we consider the impact of risk limits and illiquidity on prices
and on the equilibrium allocation of risky assets. Specifically, we consider
explicit limits on the volatilities of agents’ positions, an idealization of risk
limits imposed in practice,7 such as bounds on volatility or value at risk
(VaR).
Consider the following variant of the basic model of Section 1. Agents
have the same preferences, including intrinsic-type processes, and the same
search technology of the basic model. Rather than an asset paying a constant
7In practice, risk limits reflect agency costs, financial distress costs, and other costs
that we do not model here.
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Figure 2: The response of search discount to risk aversion.
dividend rate, however, we suppose that the illiquid asset has a dividend-rate
process X that is Le´vy, meaning that it has independent and identically dis-
tributed increments over non-overlapping time periods of equal lengths. Ex-
amples include Brownian motions, simple and compound Poisson processes,
and sums of these. Assuming that X(t) has a finite second moment, it fol-
lows, for any times t and t + u, that
Et [X(t + u)−X(t)] = mu, (21)
for a constant drift m, and that, letting vart( · ) denote Ft-conditional vari-
ance,
vart (X(t + u)−X(t)) = σ
2
Xu, (22)
for a constant volatility parameter σX > 0.
We will consider economies in which counterparties choose to trade at
a price P (X(t)) at time t, for some Lipschitz function P ( · ) that we shall
calculate in equilibrium. The total gain in market value associated with
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σD by σ.
holding one unit of the asset between times t and t + u is8
Gt,u = P (X(t + u))− P (X(t)) +
∫ t+u
t
X(s) ds. (23)
Agents are restricted to asset positions with a volatility limit σ, in the sense
that an agent is permitted to hold a position at any time t of size θ, long or
short, only if it the associated mark-to-market volatility is no greater than a
policy limit σ, in that9
limu↓0+
1
u
vart (θGt,u) ≤ σ¯
2, (24)
8The dividend process X is integrable with respect to t over compact time intevals
since, without loss of generality, a Le´vy process may be taken to be a right-continuous
left-limits process.
9Because
∫ t+u
t
X(s) ds is absolutely continuous with respect to u, this instantaneous
volatility measure is determined by the limiting variance of [P (X(t + u)) − P (X(t))]/u,
and the dividend part of the gain plays no role in this restriction.
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replacing the position limits of 0 and 1 used in the basic model.
With only these adjustments of the basic model, namely the introduction
of risky dividends and risk limits on positions, we anticipate an equilibrium
asset price per share of the form
P (X(t)) =
X(t)
r
+ p, (25)
for a constant p to be determined. The portion X(t)/r of the price that
depends on X is the same as that in an economy with no liquidity effects,
because illiquidity losses do not depend on X(t).
The conjectured price process of (25) has a constant volatility, so we
conjecture an equilibrium in which agents are either long or short by a fixed
position size θ to be determined. These holdings are determined so that a
high-type agent holds as large a long (positive) position as the risk limits
allow, while a low-type agent holds as large a short position as allowed. (The
model remains tractable if one also imposes a short-selling restriction or cost.)
The total supply of shares per investor is some constant Θ.
The masses of the four types of agents evolve according to (3). Equa-
tion (1) continues to hold, and market clearing implies that
(µlo + µho − µln − µhn)θ = Θ, (26)
that is,
µlo + µho = s ≡
Θ
2θ
+
1
2
, (27)
where we have used (1). Hence, one can solve for the equilibrium masses by
exploiting the solution obtained for the basic model of Section 1, but, in this
case, the fraction s of long position holders is endogenous.
The steady-state equilibrium price is of the conjectured form (25), and
the indirect utility of an investor of type σ is of the form
V (X(t), σ) = θσ
X(t)
r
+ θvσ, (28)
where θσ is either θ or −θ, depending on the type, and where the type-
dependent utility coefficient vσ is to be determined. The coefficients for the
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price and value functions are solved similarly to (4) and (5), in that
0 = rvlo − λu(vho − vlo)− 2λµhn(2p− vlo + vln)−
(m
r
− δ
)
0 = rvln − λu(vhn − vln) +
(m
r
− δ
)
0 = rvho − λd(vlo − vho)−
m
r
(29)
0 = rvhn − λd(vln − vhn)− 2λµho(vho − vhn − 2p) +
m
r
2p = (vlo − vln)(1− q) + (vho − vhn)q.
In particular,
P (x) =
1
r
x +
m
r2
−
δ
r
r(1− q) + λd + 2λµlo(1− q)
r + λd + 2λµlo(1− q) + λu + 2λµhnq
.
Thus, the volatility of the price is σX/r, so the largest admissible security
position size is
θ =
rσ¯
σX
. (30)
A notable impact of search is that the equilibrium position size θ decreases
with the volatility of the asset, which in turn implies the following impact of
search with risk limits on the asset price.
Proposition 4 For a given bargaining power q, fix the unique equilibria
associated with two economies that differ only with respect to the dividend
volatility coefficient, σX . The larger dividend volatility is associated with
longer expected search times for selling, and a lower asset price.
This inverse dependence of the price on the volatility of the asset is a
liquidity effect, brought about by a reduction in the risk-taking capacity of
an investor relative to the total risk to be held. A larger volatility thus implies
a smaller quantity of agents whose risk capacity qualifies them to buy the
asset (that is, fewer liquid investors who do not already own the asset).
5 Asymmetric Information
It is natural that information about future dividends held privately by agents
may be transmitted through trading. One might expect that the speed with
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which private information is spread increases with search intensities. We
show, however, that this need not be the case. If meeting intensities are low,
agents are eager to trade when they meet since they know that failure to
trade is costly. This can lead to pooling equilibria in which no information
is revealed through trading. We show that such pooling equilibria exist only
for sufficiently small search intensities, though. We do not study equilibria
in which information is disseminated through bargaining interaction, as did
Wolinsky (1990), although this would also be interesting.
We model asymmetric information as follows. A Le´vy dividend-rate pro-
cess X has a constant jump-arrival intensity λJ . At each successive jump time
τ , the dividend jump size X(τ)−X(τ−) is, with some probability 1− ζ, of
mean J0, and with probability ζ of mean J1 > J0. The unconditional mean
jump size is therefore Jm = ζJ1 + (1− ζ)J0.
At each jump time, in the event that the next jump is to be drawn with the
high conditional mean, a proportion ν ∈ [0, 1] of the agents, independently
selected, are immediately informed of this fact. The remaining agents are not.
The allocation of this information is independent of agents’ intrinsic liquidity
types. In the event that the jump is to be drawn with the low conditional
mean, nobody receives information regarding this fact. Thus, each agent is
informed with probability γν, and, conditional on not having received private
information after the last jump, has a conditional mean next-jump size of
Ju =
ζ(1− ν)J1 + (1− ζ)J0
1− ζν
.
Other than risky dividends and private information of this character, the
assumptions of the basic model of Section 1 apply.
In order to keep our analysis relatively simple, we assume that, once two
agents meet, one of them is drawn randomly to make a take-it-or-leave-it of-
fer. We use the notation qσ for the probability that an agent of type σ is the
quoting agent. We are looking for conditions under which there is a pooling
equilibrium in which sellers quote a price at which both informed and unin-
formed buyers are willing to buy, rather than quoting a more aggressive price
at which uninformed buyers would decline to trade. Likewise, buyers quote
pooling prices. Before we determine these pooling prices, we point out that
our pooling equilibrium also requires that agents with no gains from trade
must not reveal information by trading with each other. This is, however,
consistent with optimal behavior. For instance, an uninformed owner of low
intrinsic type does not sell to an informed agent with low discount rate, since
18
there are no gains from trade between the two. If such a trade were to take
place, then the uninformed would become informed, but the expected utility
of these agents would remain unchanged.10 Such trades are ruled out, for
instance, if there is an arbitrarily small non-zero cost of making an offer.
We now turn to the determination of the value functions and pooling
prices. The indirect utility of an informed agent of type σ is, in equilibrium,
of the form
θσ
X(t)
r
+ vσi,
where θσ is 0 or 1 depending on whether the type is an owner, and where
vσi is, for each σ, a coefficient to be calculated, and where the subscript i
denotes “informed.” Similarly, the equilibrium indirect utility of uniformed
agents of type σ is
θσ
X(t)
r
+ vσu.
We define the reservation-value coefficients for each of the four cases as
follows: ∆vlu = vlou − vlnu, ∆vhu = vhou − vhnu, ∆vli = vhoi − vhni, and
∆vhi = vhoi − vhni. We look for equilibria in which, naturally, informed
agents have higher reservation values than those of uninformed agents, and
all efficient trades can potentially happen, that is,
∆vhi ≥ ∆vhu ≥ ∆vli ≥ ∆vlu. (31)
The only comparison that is not immediate, ∆vhu ≥ ∆vli, is ensured by
choosing the “informational advantage,” λJ(J1 − J
u), small enough relative
to the liquidity disadvantage, determined by δ. Proposition 6 in Appendix C
makes this statement precise. Appendix C also provides a complete analysis.
Here, we give only a flavor of the analysis required. In particular, pool-
ing requires that certain incentive-compatibility constraints be met. For
instance, an informed low-type owner must prefer to quote a price accepted
by all high-type non-owners, rather than quoting a more aggressive price,
which would be accepted only by informed non-owners. That is,
∆vhu + vlni ≥ Pr(i | i) (∆vhi + vlni) + (1− Pr(i | i))vloi , (32)
where Pr(i | i) is the probability of the buyer being informed given that the
seller is informed. There are three other such constraints, but two of the four
10We note, however, that in a partially revealing equilibrium, in which being informed
would be valuable for future behavior, there could exist strictly positive gains from such
a trade.
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conditions, in total, suffice, since these two imply the other two. The analysis
in Appendix C shows that these incentive-compatibility constraints guarantee
the existence of a pooling equilibrium. Below, we provide an example in
which a pooling equilibrium exists for an open set of parameters. A pooling
equilibrium exists, however, only if the meeting intensity λ is sufficiently
low.11 If λ is high, then uninformed high-valuation non-owners, for instance,
find it profitable not to offer a price that reflects good information, but,
rather, one that is only accepted by uninformed sellers. The intuition behind
the result is simple: Failure to trade at any given opportunity is less costly
when meeting other agents is easy. We summarize with the following result.
Proposition 5 For any set of parameters for which s 6= λu/(λu + λd), there
exists a search intensity λ¯ such that, for all λ > λ¯, a pooling equilibrium
cannot exist.
When search is less intense, however, pooling equilibria may exist for an open
set of parameters. Figure 4 provides an illustrative numerical example.
We use the parameters of Table 1 and take J0 = 1, J1 = 1.1, λJ = 0.2,
and ζ = 0.5. We compute, for a range of contact intensities (λ), the minimal
and maximal proportions of informed agents, ν, consistent with a pooling
equilibrium. We see that, as λ increases, ν is confined to a smaller and smaller
interval, depicted as the shaded region of Figure 4, until the two sufficient
incentive-compatibility conditions can no longer be satisfied simultaneously.
One can see that the seller’s incentive constraint for pooling is more sensitive
to λ than is the buyer’s, because the buy side of the market is larger than
the sell side. Hence, as λ increases, a seller’s meeting intensity converges to
infinity, which makes it tempting for the seller to quote aggressive prices.
The buyer’s meeting intensity, on the other hand, is bounded as λ increases.
6 Market Implications
Our framework has several asset pricing implications for over-the-counter
(OTC) markets, that is, markets characterized by bilateral negotiation, de-
11There is one knife-edge parameter configuration, namely s = λu/(λu+λd), under which
a high λ need not destroy the pooling equilibrium. That should come as no surprise, since
in this knife-edge case even a competitive market equilibrium is supported by a range of
prices bounded by the proposed pooling prices.
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J1 = 1.1, and ζ = 0.5.
layed by search for suitable counterparties. These price effects may be rele-
vant for private equity, real estate, and OTC-traded financial products such
as interest-rate swaps and other OTC derivatives, mortgage-backed securi-
ties, corporate bonds, government bonds, emerging-market debt, and bank
loans. Exemplifying the imperfect ability to match buyers and sellers in OTC
markets, traders in the market for European corporate loans have ironically
described12 trade in that market as “by appointment.”
Even in the most liquid OTC markets, the relatively small price effects
arising from search frictions receive significant attention by economists. For
12See The Financial Times, November 19, 2003.
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example, the market for U.S. Treasury securities, an over-the-counter market
considered to be a benchmark for high liquidity, is subject to widely noted
illiquidity effects that differentiate the yields of on-the-run (latest-issue) se-
curities from those of off-the-run securities. Positions in on-the-run securities
are normally available in large amounts from relatively easily found traders
such as hedge funds and government-bond dealers. Because on-the-run is-
sues can be more quickly located by short-term investors such as hedgers
and speculators, they command a price premium, even over a package of off-
the-run securities of identical cash flows. Ironically, the importance ascribed
to this relatively small premium is explained by the exceptionally high vol-
ume of trade in this market, and also by the importance of disentangling the
illiquidity impact on measured Treasury interest rates for informational pur-
poses elsewhere in the economy. Longstaff (2002) measures relatively larger
illiquidity effects on government security prices during “flights to liquidity,”
which he characterizes as periods during which a large demand for quick ac-
cess to a safe haven causes Treasury prices to temporarily achieve markedly
higher prices than equally safe government securities that are not as easily
found.
Part of the price impact represented by the spread between on-the-run and
off-the-run treasuries is conveyed by shortsellers who are willing to pay a lend-
ing premium to owners of relatively easily located securities. A search-based
theory of securities lending is developed in Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen
(2002). Empirical evidence of the impact on treasury prices and securities-
lending premia (“repo specials”) can be found in Duffie (1996), Jordan and
Jordan (1997), and Krishnamurthy (2002). Fleming and Garbade (2003)
document a new U.S. Governnment program to improve liquidity in treasury
markets by allowing alternative types of treasury securities to be deliverable
in settlement of a given repurchase agreement, mitigating the costs of search
for a particular issue. Related effects in equity markets are measured by
Geczy, Musto, and Reed (2002), D’Avolio (2002), and Jones and Lamont
(2002). Difficulties in locating lenders of shares sometimes cause dramatic
price imperfections, as was the case with the spinoff of Palm, Incorporated,
one of a number of such cases documented by Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford
(2002).
The potential for much larger price impacts in relatively less liquid OTC
markets is exemplified in a study of Chinese equity prices by Chen and Xiong
(2001). Certain Chinese companies have two classes of shares, one exchange
traded, the other consisting of “restricted institutional shares” (RIS), which
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can be traded only privately. The two classes of shares are identical in every
other respect, including their cash flows. Chen and Xiong (2001) find that
RIS shares trade at an average discount of about 80% to the corresponding
exchange-traded shares. Similarly, in a study involving U.S. equities, Silber
(1991) compares the prices of “restricted stock” — which, for two years, can
be traded only in private among a restriced class of sophisticated investors —
with the prices of unrestricted shares of the same companies. Silber (1991)
finds that restricted stocks trade at an average discount of 30%, and that
the discount for restricted stock is increasing in the relative size of the issue.
These price discounts can be captured in our search framework, but would be
difficult to explain using standard models based on asymmetric information,
given that the two classes of shares are claims to the same dividend streams,
and given that the publicly-traded share prices are easily observable.
Our model can be used to predict the implications of a widespread shock
to the abilities or incentives of traders to take asset positions. Such a “wealth
shock” can be captured in our model by a simultaneous move by many (a
non-zero mass of) investors to the low intrinsic state, leading to a sudden
increase in the number of sellers (µlo rises) and reduction in the number of
buyers (µhn falls). As a result, the price drops. A similar effect would occur
with an upward shock to the transition intensity λd with which investors
migrate to the low intrinsic state. The price drop is caused in part by a
higher fraction of assets held by distressed traders, but, importantly, also
by the worsened bargaining position of sellers. The effect is temporary if
the transition intensities λu and λd are unaffected by the shock, and can
otherwise be long-lived. As we have shown in Sections 2–4, if agents are
risk averse or have risk limits, an increase in the risk of the asset has similar
implications. Higher risk (in the form of higher dividend volatility or higher
correlation between the dividends and the endowment processes) leads to
larger utility losses for distressed agents. Agents can compensate for the
increased risk by reducing their position limits, but then a larger fraction of
the agents must hold the risky asset, and liquidity is further reduced because
finding a buyer becomes more difficult. Hence, shocks to volatility can lead
to liquidity problems and price drops, especially if risk-management practices
imply a simultaneous tightening of position limits.
Search frictions also help explain how the relative size of an asset in the
economy may affect its price (or price-dividend ratio). Proposition 1 shows
that if a higher fraction (s) of the agents must hold the asset, then the price
must fall. This resembles the usual effect of a downward-sloping demand
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curve. When comparing stocks in the cross section, however, there is the
additional effect that more investors typically participate in the market for
larger stocks, which also usually have a greater presence by marketmakers.
(Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2003) study marketmakers and endogenize
their search intensity.) If, for instance, the number of investors participating
in the market for a firm’s shares is proportional to the size of the company,
then this corresponds in our model to a higher13 search intensity λ, leading
to a more liquid market with a higher price-dividend ratio. (This result also
holds if we assume that non-owners switch markets in a manner implying
that the value Vln of being a non-owner is equal to some constant for all
markets.)
Such cross-sectional asset-pricing results are studied more directly by
Weill (2002), who extends our model to the case of multiple assets and shows,
among other things, that securities with a larger free float (shares available
for trade) are more liquid and have lower expected returns. Vayanos and
Wang (2002) also extend our model so as to explain concentrations of trade
in a favored security, explaining for example the price difference between
on-the-run and off-the-run Treasury bonds.
A different set of implications for financial markets is obtained in Duffie,
Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2003), which studies marketmakers.14 Outside in-
vestors remain able to find other investors with intensity λ, but in addition
find marketmakers with some intensity ρ. This framework captures the fea-
ture that investors bargain sequentially with marketmakers.
The price negotiation between a marketmaker and an investor reflects
the investor’s outside options, including in particular the investor’s ability
to meet and trade with other investors or marketmakers. It is shown that
the marketmaker’s bid-ask spread is lower if the investor can find other in-
vestors on his own more easily. Further, the spread is lower if an investor can
approach other marketmakers more easily. In other words, more “sophisti-
cated” investors get tighter spreads from the marketmaker. Examples can
be found in the typical hub-and-spoke structure of contact among market-
makers and their customers in OTC derivative markets. This distinguishes
our search theory from traditional information-based theories that predict
that more sophisticated (in this setting, more informed) investors get wider
13A higher total mass, µ, of participating agents leads to higher search intensities λµ,
so if we re-normalize the mass to µ = 1, we must simultaneously increase λ.
14Other search-based models of intermediation include Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987),
Bhattacharya and Hagerty (1987), Moresi (1991), Gehrig (1993), and Yavas¸ (1996).
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spreads from marketmakers (Glosten and Milgrom (1985)).
The search-and-bargaining framework is a reasonable stylization of broker-
dealer behavior in OTC markets for fixed-income derivatives. In these mar-
kets, a “sales trader” and an outside customer negotiate a price, implicitly
including a dealer profit margin, that is based in large part on the customer’s
(perceived) outside option. In this setting, the risk that customers have su-
perior information about future interest rates is often regarded as small. The
customer’s outside option depends on how easily he can find a counterparty
himself (proxied by λ in the model) and how easily he can access other
dealers (proxied by ρ in the model). As explained by Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue (2001) (page 13) in recent litigation regarding the portion of
dealer margins on interest-rate swaps that can be ascribed to profit, dealers
typically negotiate prices with outside customers that reflect the customer’s
relative lack of access to other market participants. In order to trade OTC
derivatives with a bank, for example, a customer must have, among other
arrangements, an account and a credit clearance. Smaller customers often
have an account with only one, or perhaps a few, banks, and therefore have
fewer search options. Hence, a testable implication of our search framework
is that (small) investors with fewer search options receive less competitive
prices. We note that these investors are less likely to be informed, so that
models based on informational asymmetries alone would reach the opposite
prediction.
Our results have been extended to illustrate that temporary external sup-
ply imbalances may have much bigger impacts on prices than would be the
case with perfectly liquid markets, and that the degree of these price impacts
can be mitigated by providers of liquidity such as underwriters, hedge funds,
and marketmakers. Weill (2003) uses our approach to characterize the opti-
mal behavior of marketmakers in absorbing supply shocks in order to mitigate
search frictions by “leaning against” the outside order flow. Newman and
Rierson (2003) use our approach in a search-based model of corporate bond
pricing, in which large issues of credit-risky bonds temporarily raise credit
spreads throughout the issuer’s sector, because providers of liquidity such
as underwriters and hedge finds bear extra risk as they search for long-term
investors. They provide empirical evidence of temporary bulges in credit
spreads across the European Telecom debt market during 1999-2002 in re-
sponse to large issues by individual firms in this sector. Studying a different
set of markets, Mikkelson and Partch (1985) find empirical support for “the
notion that underwriting spreads are in part compensation for the selling ef-
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fort.” In particular, they find that underwriting spreads are positively related
to the size of the offering.
Appendices
A Explicit Bargaining Game
The setting considered here is that of Section 1, with two exceptions. First,
agents can interact only at discrete moments in time, ∆t apart. Later, we
return to continuous time by letting ∆t go to zero. Second, the bargaining
game is modeled explicitly.
We follow Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and others in modeling an
alternating-offers bargaining game, making the adjustments required by the
specifics of our setup. When two agents are matched, one of them is chosen
randomly — the seller with probability qˆ, the buyer with probability 1 − qˆ
— to suggest a trading price. The other either rejects or accepts the offer,
immediately. If the offer is rejected, the owner receives the dividend from
the asset during the current period. At the next period, ∆t later, one of
the two agents is chosen at random, independently, to make a new offer.
The bargaining may, however, break down before a counteroffer is made. A
breakdown may occur because either of the agents changes valuation type,
whence there are no longer gains from trade. A breakdown may also occur
if one of the agents meets yet another agent, and leaves his current trading
partner. The latter reason for breakdown is only relevant if agents are allowed
to search while engaged in negotiation.
We consider first the case in which agents can search while bargaining.
We assume that, given contact with an alternative partner, they leave the
present partner in order to negotiate with the newly found one. The offerer
suggests the price that leaves the other agent indifferent between accept-
ing and rejecting it. In the unique subgame perfect equilibrium, the offer
is accepted immediately (Rubinstein (1982)). The value from rejecting is
associated with the equilibrium strategies being played from then ownards.
Letting Pσ be the price suggested by the agent of type σ with σ ∈ {lo, hn},
letting P¯ = qˆPlo + (1− qˆ)Phn, and making use of the motion laws of Vlo and
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Vhn, we have
Phn −∆Vl = e
−(r+λd+λu+2λµlo+2λµhn)∆t(P¯ −∆Vl) + O(∆
2
t )
−Plo + ∆Vh = e
−(r+λd+λu+2λµlo+2λµhn)∆t(−P¯ + ∆Vh) + O(∆
2
t ) .
These prices, Phn and Plo, have the same limit P = lim∆t→0 Phn = lim∆t→0 Plo.
The two equations above readily imply that the limit price and limit value
functions satisfy
P = ∆Vl (1− q) + ∆Vh q, (A.1)
with
q = qˆ. (A.2)
This result is interesting because it shows that the seller’s bargaining power,
q, does not depend on the parameters — only on the likelihood that the seller
is chosen to make an offer. In particular, an agent’s intensity of meeting other
trading partners does not influence q. This is because one’s own ability to
meet an alternative trading partner: (i) makes oneself more impatient, and
(ii) also increases the partner’s risk of breakdown, and these two effects cancel
out.
This analysis shows that the bargaining outcome used in our model can
be justified by an explicit bargaining procedure. We note, however, that
other bargaining procedures lead to other outcomes. For instance, if agents
cannot search for alternative trading partners during negotiations, then the
same price formula (A.1) applies with
q =
qˆ(r + λu + λd + 2λµlo)
qˆ(r + λu + λd + 2λµlo) + (1− qˆ)(r + λu + λd + 2λµhn)
. (A.3)
This bargaining outcome would lead to a similar solution for prices, but the
comparative-static results would change, since the bargaining power q would
depend on the other parameters.
B Walrasian Equilibrium with Risk Aversion
This section derives the competitive equilibrium with risk averse agents (as
in Section 2) who can immediately trade any number of risky securities. We
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note that this is different from a competitive market with fixed exogenous
position sizes, that is, it is different from the limit considered in Proposition 3.
Suppose that the Walrasian price is constant at P , that is, agents can
trade instantly at this price. An agent’s total wealth — cash plus the value
of his position in risky assets — is denoted by W¯ . If an agent chooses to
hold θ(t) shares at any time t, then the wealth-dynamics equation is
dW¯t = (rW¯t − rθtP − ct) dt + θt dDt + dηt.
The HJB equation for an agent of intrinsic type σ ∈ {h, l} is
0 = sup
c,θ
{Jw(w, σ)(rw − c + θ(mD − rP ) + mη)
+
1
2
Jww(w, σ)(θ
2σ2D + σ
2
η + 2ρσθσDση)
+ λ(σ, σ′)[J(w, σ)− J(w, σ′)]− e−γc − βJ(w, σ)},
where λ(σ, σ′) is the intensity of change of intrinsic type from σ to σ ′. Con-
jecturing the value function J(w, σ) = −e−rγ(w+aσ+a¯), optimization over θ
yields
θσ =
mD − rP − rγρσσDση
rγσ2D
. (B.1)
Market clearing requires
µhθh + µlθl = Θ,
with µh = 1− µl = λu/(λu + λd), which gives the price
P =
mD
r
− γ
(
Θσ2D +
σDση [ρlλd + ρhλu]
λu + λd
)
. (B.2)
Inserting this price into (B.1) gives the quantity choices
θh = Θ +
σηλd [ρl − ρh]
σD(λu + λd)
(B.3)
θl = Θ−
σηλu [ρl − ρh]
σD(λu + λd)
. (B.4)
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C Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: The dependence on δ and q is seen immediately,
given that no other variable entering Equation (6) depends on either δ or q.
Viewing P and µσ as functions of the parameters λd and s, a simple
differentiation exercise shows that the derivative of the price P with respect
to λd is a positive multiple of
(rq + λu + 2λµhnq)
(
1 + 2λ
∂µlo
∂λd
(1− q)
)
− (r(1− q) + λd + 2λµlo(1− q))
(
2λ
∂µhn
∂λd
q
)
,
which is positive if ∂µlo
∂λd
is positive and ∂µhn
∂λd
is negative.
These two facts are seen as follows. From Equations (1)-(3) and the fact
that µlo + µln = λd(λd + λu)
−1 = 1− y, where
y =
λu
λu + λd
,
it follows that µlo solves the equation
2λµ2lo + (2λ(y − s) + λu + λd)µlo − λds = 0. (C.1)
This quadratic equation has a negative root and a root in the interval (0, 1),
and this latter root is µlo.
Differentiating (C.1) with respect to λd, one finds that
∂µlo
∂λd
=
s− µlo − 2λ
∂y
∂λd
µlo
2λµlo + 2λ(y − s) + λu + λd
> 0,
since ∂y
∂λd
< 0. Similar calculations show that
∂µhn
∂λd
=
−λd + 2λ
∂y
∂λd
µhn
2λµlo + λu + λd
< 0,
which ends the proof of the claim that the price decreases with λd. Like
arguments can be used to show that ∂µlo
∂λu
< 0 and that ∂µhn
∂λu
> 0, which
implies that P increases with λu.
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Finally,
∂µlo
∂s
=
λd + 2λµlo
2λµlo + 2λ(y − s) + λu + λd
> 0
and
∂µhn
∂s
=
−λu − 2λµhn
2λµlo + λu + λd
< 0,
showing that the price decreases with the supply s.
In order to prove that the price increases with λ for λ large enough, it is
sufficient to show that the derivative of the price with respect to λ changes
sign at most a finite number of times, and that the price tends to its upper
bound, 1/r, as λ tends to infinity. The first statement is obvious, while
the second one follows from Equation (6), given that, under the assumption
s < λu/(λu + λd), λµlo stays bounded and λµhn goes to infinity with λ.

Proof of Proposition 2.
We impose on investors’ choices of consumption and trading strategies the
transversality condition that, for any initial agent type σ0, e
−βT E0[J(WT , σt)] →
0 as T goes to infinity. Intuitively, the condition means that agents cannot
consume large amounts forever by increasing their debt without restriction.
We must show that our candidate optimal consumption and trading strategy
satisfies that condition.
We conjecture that, for our candidate optimal strategy, E0[J(WT , σT )] =
e(β−r)T J(W0, σ0). Clearly, this implies that the transversality condition is
satisfied since e−βT E0[J(WT , σT )] = e
−rT J(W0, σ0) → 0. This conjecture
is based on the insights that (i) the marginal utility, u′(c0), of time-0 con-
sumption must be equal to the marginal utility, e(r−β)T E0[u
′(cT )], of time
T consumption; and (ii) the marginal utility is proportional to the value
function in our (CARA) framework. (See Wang (2002) for a similar result.)
To prove our conjecture, we consider, for our candidate optimal policy,
the wealth dynamics
dW =
(
log r
γ
− raσ − ra¯ + θσmD + mη
)
dt + θσσD dB + ση dB
i − P dθσ
=
(
−raσ + θσmD +
1
2
rγσ2η +
r − β
rγ
)
dt + θσσD dB + ση dB
i − P dθσ
= M(σ) dt +
√
Σ(σ) dBˆ − P dθσ,
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where M , Σ and the standard Brownian motion Bˆ are defined by the last
equation.
Define f by
f(Wt, σt, t) = Et[J(WT , σT )] = −Et[e
−rγ(WT +aσT +a¯)].
Then, by Ito’s Formula,
0 = ft + fwM(σ) +
1
2
fwwΣ(σ) (C.2)
+
∑
{σ′ : σ′ 6=σ}
λ(σ, σ′) (f(w + z(σ, σ′)P, σ′, t)− f(w, σ, t)) ,
where λ(σ, σ′) is the intensity of transition from σ to σ′ and z(σ, σ′) is −1, 1,
or 0, depending on whether the transition is, respectively, a buy, a sell, or an
intrinsic-type change. The boundary condition is f(w, σ, T ) = −e−rγ(w+aσ+a¯).
The fact that f(w, σ, t) = e(β−r)(T−t)J(w, σ) now follows from the facts
that (i) this function clearly satisfies the boundary condition, and (ii) it
solves (C.2), which is confirmed directly using (15) for aσ.

Proof of Proposition 3.
This result follows from Equations (15)–(18) as well as the fact that
λµhn →∞ and λµlo is bounded.

Proof of Proposition 4: As stated formally by Equation (30), the posi-
tion θ decreases with the volatility σX . As a consequence, the equilibrium
agent masses change with an increase in σX in the same way as when the
supply of the asset increases. That means, in particular, that µhn decreases,
which translates into longer search times for a seller (type lo). Proposition 1
establishes that the price decreases with the supply, whence also with the
volatility σX of the dividends .

Analysis of pooling equilibria with asymmetric information: We
work under condition (31), which means that prices are set by the reservation
values of the informed seller and uninformed buyer, and that the bid is higher
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than the ask. Let µ denote the non-jump part of the drift of X. That is,
Es[Xt −Xs] = (µ + νJm)(t − s). Under these conditions, the coefficients of
the value-functions and price satisfy
vloi =
λuvhoi + 2λµhn(p + vlni) + λJ(ζνvloi + (1− ζν)vlou) + λJJ1 + r
−1µ− δ
r + λu + 2λµhn + λJ
vlni =
λuvhni + λJ(ζνvlni + (1− ζν)vlnu)
r + λu + λJ
vhoi =
λdvloi + λJ(ζνvhoi + (1− ζν)vhou) + λJJ1 + r
−1µ
r + λd + λJ
vhni =
λdvlni + 2λµlo(vhoi − p) + λJ(ζνvhni + (1− ζν)vhnu)
r + λd + 2λµlo + λJ
(C.3)
vlou =
λuvhou + 2λµhn(p + vlni) + λJ(ζνvloi + (1− ζν)vlou) + λJJ
u + r−1µ− δ
r + λu + 2λµhn + λJ
vlnu =
λuvhnu + λJ(ζνvlni + (1− ζν)vlnu)
r + λu + λJ
vhou =
λdvlou + λJ(ζνvhoi + (1− ζν)vhou) + λJJ
u + r−1µ
r + λd + λJ
vhnu =
λdvlnu + 2λµlo(vhou − p) + λJ(ζνvhni + (1− ζν)vhnu)
r + λd + 2λµlo + λJ
p = (vloi − vlni)(1− q) + (vhou − vhnu)q .
We may view p as an expected-price coefficient; the realized-price coefficient
is vloi − vlni or vhou − vhnu, depending on who makes the offer.
In order for a pooling equilibrium to obtain, no agent should be willing
to deviate from proposing the pooling prices. First, a low-valuation owner,
whether informed or not, must prefer to quote a price that is accepted by all
liquid non-owners, rather than quoting a more aggressive price, which would
be accepted only by informed non-owners. That is,
∆vhu + vlni ≥ Pr(i | i) (∆vhi + vlni) + (1− Pr(i | i))vloi (C.4)
∆vhu + vlnu ≥ Pr(i |u) (∆vhi + vlnu) + (1− Pr(i |u))vlou, (C.5)
where Pr(i | ξ) is the probability of the buyer being informed given that the
seller has information status ξ ∈ {i, u}. The left-hand side of (C.4) is the
value ∆vhu to an informed low-type owner of quoting the pooling price (given
that there are gains from trade with this counterparty). The right-hand side
is the value ∆vhi of asking for the most aggressive price, namely the reserva-
tion value of an informed non-owner (again, given that there are gains from
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trade with this counterparty). Similarly, (C.5) states that an uninformed
low-discount-rate owner prefers to quote the pooling price. We note that
(C.4)–(C.5) are based implicitly on an assumption about the uninformed
investors’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs. In particular, these beliefs must be con-
sistent with the assumption that investors are not willing to pay more than
their reservation values. One possible choice of out-of-equilibrium beliefs is
that conditional on any out-of-equilibrium price offer, the expected jump of
an uninformed remains Ju. While other beliefs are possible, there is no other
pooling equilibrium in terms of prices and allocations.
Also, a high-type non-owner, whether informed or not, must prefer to
buy at the pooling price with certainty rather than buying at a lower price
only from uninformed sellers, that is,
vhoi −∆vli ≥ Pr(u | i) (vhoi −∆vlu) + (1− Pr(u | i)) vhni (C.6)
vhou −∆vli ≥ Pr(u |u) (vhou −∆vlu) + (1− Pr(u |u)) vhnu. (C.7)
It turns out that only the optimality conditions of the informed seller (C.4),
and of the uninformed buyer (C.7) need to be checked. If these two condi-
tions are satisfied, the other two optimality conditions follow automatically.
(Proposition 6 below formalizes this claim.)
For a given set of parameters, either of the necessary and sufficient op-
timality conditions, (C.4) and (C.7), may or may not hold. Intuitively, the
first condition fails when, keeping all other parameters fixed, there are “so
many” informed agents (ν is sufficiently high) that an (informed) seller would
benefit by quoting an aggressive price and risking the loss of a trade with
an uninformed agent. Similarly, the second condition fails when, keeping
all other parameters fixed, an uninformed buyer perceives the proportion
of uninformed agents as too large given his own lack of information (ν is
sufficiently small or large).
Proposition 6 (i) The solution to the linear system (C.3) satisfies ∆vli ≥
∆vlu and ∆vhi ≥ ∆vhu. (ii) Fix all the parameters with the exception of
λ, J0, and J1. Then there exists  > 0 such that, whenever (J1 − J
u) < ,
∆vhu ≥ ∆vli for all λ > 0. (iii) If the solution to the linear system (C.3)
satisfies ∆vhi ≥ ∆vhu ≥ ∆vli ≥ ∆vlu, then conditions (C.4) and (C.7) ensure
that this solution defines a pooling equilibrium.
Proof: Let φh = ∆vhi − ∆vhu and φl = ∆vli − ∆vlu. Appropriate linear
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combinations of Equations (C.3) yield
[
r + λu + 2λµhn + λJ(1− νζ) −λu
−λd r + λd + 2λµlo + λJ(1− νζ)
] [
φl
φh
]
= λJ(J1 − J
u)
[
1
1
]
,
which is immediately checked to have a positive solution.
For part (ii) , note that, when J1 = J0 = J
u, for the same reasons as in the
main model, ∆vhi = ∆vhu > ∆vli = ∆vlu. Since the difference ∆vhu − ∆vli
is of the form
α0
λ + β0
−
α′0 + α
′
1λ
β′0 + β
′
1λ + λ
2
(J1 − J
u),
with all the coefficients bounded uniformly in λ and independent of the jump
sizes, and α0 > 0 and β0 > 0, the claim follows.
Let us now turn to part (iii) of the proposition. Consider a seller with
information status pi ∈ {i, u}. The seller’s bargaining power does not matter,
since we assume that it is captured by an independent random draw that
determines which side makes the “take-it-or-leave-it” offer. Our analysis
first conditions on the event that the seller makes the offer. Equations (C.4)
and (C.5) can be written as
∆vhu ≥ ∆vhiPr(i |pi) + ∆vlpi (1− Pr(i |pi)) .
In order to show that the constraint for pi = i is stronger than the constraint
for pi = u, it suffices to show that
∆vhiPr(i | i) + ∆vliPr(u | i) ≥ ∆vhiPr(i |u) + ∆vluPr(u |u),
which is equivalent to
(∆vhi −∆vli)Pr(u | i) ≤ (∆vhi −∆vlu)Pr(u |u),
which in turn holds because ∆vli ≥ ∆vlu and Pr(u | i) ≤ Pr(u |u).
Analogously, one deduces that the uninformed-buyer condition is stronger
than the informed-buyer condition. Consequently, if (C.4) and (C.7) hold,
then (C.5) and (C.6) also do, whence quoting pooling prices is optimal for
all agents, given that everybody else does the same. This proves that the
solution to (C.3) defines a pooling equilibrium.
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Proof of Proposition 5: Assume first that s < λu/(λu + λd). Consider,
for each pair consisting of an owner and a non-owner of a given type, the
difference of the equations in the system (C.3) corresponding to their value
functions. Since λµhn goes to infinity with λ, while λµlo is bounded, one
shows that
lim
λ→∞
∆vlu = lim
λ→∞
∆vli = lim
λ→∞
∆vhu < lim
λ→∞
∆vhi.
This conclusion is inconsistent with inequalities (C.4) and (C.5), which means
that a pooling equilibrium cannot obtain for high λ. The intuition for the
result is that an increase in λ increases without bound the ability to find an
informed buyer, who is willing to pay strictly more than the pooling price.
ate with λ, making pooling unattractive to the seller.
Analogously, when s > λu/(λu+λd), one shows that the reservation-value
coefficient of the uninformed seller, ∆vlu, does not converge (from below) to
the common limit as the search ability for sellers converges to infinity, making
it worthwhile to a buyer to quote aggressively.

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